The intricate web of international relations and energy dependencies is laid bare as we delve into the story of Russian enriched uranium shipments to a Canadian-owned company in the U.S. This narrative unfolds against the backdrop of Russia's military occupation of Ukraine's largest nuclear plant and its attacks on the country's power infrastructure.
In a world where energy security is a critical concern, the dependence of Europe and the United States on Russian nuclear fuel is a fascinating and worrying development. Canadian-owned Westinghouse Electric, a key player in this story, receives low-enriched uranium (LEU) from Russia to power commercial nuclear reactors in the U.S. This raises immediate questions about the geopolitical implications and the potential vulnerabilities of relying on a hostile nation for such a vital resource.
The U.S. government, recognizing the risks, banned the import of Russian enriched uranium in 2024. However, the existence of waivers that allow for continued imports if no alternative sources are available or if it's deemed in the national interest, reveals a complex balance between energy security and economic realities. These waivers are set to expire in 2028, but the question remains: will the U.S. and its allies be able to wean themselves off Russian uranium by then?
The numbers are staggering: in 2025 alone, the U.S. imported 400 tonnes of LEU from Russia, worth around $1 billion. This trade benefits not only Russian state-owned entities like Rosatom and Tenex but also French-owned companies like Framatome and Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, as well as Westinghouse. The European Union, notably, has no ban on such imports, and Canada has not sanctioned doing business with these Russian entities.
Dmitry Gorchakov, a nuclear adviser at Bellona, a Lithuanian environmental transparency center, emphasizes the need to reduce dependence on Russia. He argues that all countries should strive to cancel all possible cooperation with Russia in this sector, given the ongoing war and direct threat to Ukraine.
The shipping data analyzed by CBC's the fifth estate provides a detailed picture of this trade. It reveals that over the four-year period of the war in Ukraine, Tenex, the Russian exporter, has been sending various amounts of uranium to Westinghouse's fuel fabrication plant in South Carolina. In one shipment this year, Tenex delivered over 50,000 kilograms of uranium, a significant amount that underscores the scale of this trade.
The process involves turning this enriched uranium into fuel pellets and then fuel rod assemblies, which are sent to commercial nuclear power reactors. The intricate supply chain, involving multiple parties and contracts, highlights the complexity of the nuclear fuel industry and the challenges of diversifying away from Russian sources.
Westinghouse, which is majority-owned by Brookfield Renewable Partners, a Toronto-based investment firm, and Cameco Corporation, a Saskatchewan-based uranium miner, has remained silent on this issue. Cameco, while owning two operating uranium mines in Saskatchewan, has reported lobbying on the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, but its reasons for doing so remain unclear.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration, citing privacy concerns, does not publish the total amount of uranium purchased from Russia. However, its latest report reveals that Russia was the largest foreign provider of uranium enrichment services to the U.S. in 2025. This dependence on Russian uranium is not just a U.S. issue but a global one, with Russia supplying approximately 44% of the world's enriched uranium and 20-30% of that used in the U.S. and Europe.
Jeremy Whitlock, a Canadian nuclear scientist, explains that changing this global infrastructure takes time, even with the intent to do so. The challenge is to balance the immediate need for this critical resource with the long-term goal of reducing dependence on Russia.
Westinghouse's role in this story is significant, especially given its plans to invest up to $100 billion in U.S. nuclear reactors and its potential involvement in a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. While Canada, with its 16 operating CANDU reactors, doesn't need enriched uranium, its proposed new reactors, including small modular reactors, would. The federal government's announcement to backstop enriched nuclear fuel purchase contracts from allied countries is a step towards reducing reliance on Russia, but the path is not without challenges.
Canada, despite imposing sanctions on over 2,600 Russian entities and individuals, has not sanctioned Rosatom or Tenex. The European Union, too, has not banned the importation of Russian enriched uranium, despite imposing 21 packages of sanctions against Russia.
Marcus Kolga, a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, advocates for tougher sanctions, arguing that every dollar flowing into Rosatom strengthens a Russian state enterprise tied to Moscow's war against Ukraine. He emphasizes the need for Canada and its allies to prevent Western companies from engaging with Russian state nuclear entities.
In a twist of fate, Westinghouse and Cameco, while doing business with Russia, are also supporting Ukraine. Both companies have entered into agreements with Ukraine's Energoatom, with Westinghouse supplying fuel and building new reactors, and Cameco supplying uranium hexafluoride. This dual role highlights the complex nature of international relations and the delicate balance between economic interests and geopolitical realities.
As we reflect on this story, it becomes clear that the issue of energy security is deeply intertwined with global politics. The dependence on Russian uranium, the efforts to reduce this dependence, and the potential vulnerabilities that arise from such dependencies, all paint a complex picture of the modern world. It is a story that underscores the need for careful consideration of energy sources and the potential risks associated with them, especially in a world where geopolitical tensions can have far-reaching consequences.
